Abstract. An XML web service is, to a first approximation, an RPC service in which requests and responses are encoded in XML as SOAP envelopes, and transported over HTTP. We consider the problem of authenticating requests and responses at the SOAP-level, rather than relying on transport-level security. We propose a security abstraction, inspired by earlier work on secure RPC, in which the methods exported by a web service are annotated with one of three security levels: none, authenticated, or both authenticated and encrypted. We model our abstraction as an object calculus with primitives for defining and calling web services. We describe the semantics of our object calculus by translating to a lower-level language with primitives for message passing and cryptography. To validate our semantics, we embed correspondence assertions that specify the correct authentication of requests and responses. By appeal to the type theory for cryptographic protocols of Gordon and Jeffrey's Cryptyc, we verify the correspondence assertions simply by typing. Finally, we describe an implementation of our semantics via custom SOAP headers.
Introduction
It is common to provide application-level developers with security abstractions that hide detailed implementations at lower levels of a protocol stack. For example, the identity of the sender of a message may be exposed directly at the application-level, but computed via a hidden, lower level cryptographic protocol. The purpose of this paper is to explore how to build formal models of such security abstractions, and how to validate their correct implementation in terms of cryptographic primitives. Our setting is an experimental implementation of SOAP security headers for XML web services. statements within the calculus. We use a form of the spi-calculus [22] , equipped with a type and effect system able to prove by typechecking that correspondence assertions hold in spite of an arbitrary attacker. Spi [5] is a small concurrent language with primitives for message passing and cryptography, derived from the π-calculus [32] .
Contributions of this Paper
Our approach is as follows:
• Section 2 describes our high-level abstraction for secure messaging.
• Section 3 models the abstraction as an object calculus with primitives for creating and calling web services.
• Section 4 defines the semantics of our abstraction by translating to the spi-calculus. Correspondence assertions specify the authenticity guarantees offered to caller and callee, and are verified by typechecking.
• Section 5 describes a SOAP-based implementation using Visual Studio .NET.
• Section 6 shows how we can accommodate public-key infrastructures to implement the abstraction of Section 2.
Our main innovation is the idea of formalizing the authentication guarantees offered by a security abstraction by embedding correspondence assertions in its semantics. On the other hand, our high-level abstraction is fairly standard, and is directly inspired by work on secure network objects [35] . Although the rather detailed description of our model and its semantics may seem complex, the actual cryptographic protocol is actually quite simple. Still, we believe our framework and its implementation are a solid foundation for developing more sophisticated protocols and their abstractions.
Many formal details, as well as the proofs of our formal results, have been relegated to the appendices. Specifically, Appendix A gives sample messages exchanged during web service method calls using our abstractions, Appendix B gives a formal description of our object calculus, Appendix C gives a formal definition of the spi-calculus used in the paper, Appendix D gives the proofs of our formal results, and Appendix E describes an extension of our object calculus to capture a form of first-class web services.
A part of this article, in preliminary form, appears as a conference paper [24] .
A Security Abstraction
We introduce a security abstraction for web services, where the methods exported by a web service are annotated by one of three security levels:
None unauthenticated call Auth authenticated call AuthEnc authenticated and encrypted call A call from a client to a web service is made up of two messages, the request from the client to the web service, and the response from the web service to the client. The inspiration for the security levels, and the guarantees they provide, comes from SRC Secure Network Objects [35] . An authenticated web method call provides a guarantee of integrity (that the request that the service receives is exactly the one sent by the client and that the response that the client receives is exactly the one sent by the service as a response to this request) and at-most-once semantics (that the service receives the request most once, and that the client receives the response at most once). An authenticated and encrypted web method call provides all the guarantees of an authenticated call, along with a guarantee of secrecy (that an eavesdropper does not obtain any part of the method name, the arguments, or the results of the call).
We use the language C # to present our security abstraction. (There is nothing specific to C # in our approach, although the implementation we describe in this section and in Section 5 takes advantage of some features of the language.) In C # , where users can specify attributes on various entities, our security annotations take the form of an attribute on web methods, that is, the methods exported by a web service. The attribute is written [SecurityLevel(level )], where level is one of None, Auth, or AuthEnc. For example, consider a simple interface to a banking service, where [WebMethod] is an attribute used to indicate a method exported by a web service: The annotations get implemented by code to perform the authentication and encryption, at the level of SOAP envelopes, transparently from the user. The annotations on the web service side will generate a method on the web service that can be used to establish a security context. This method will never be invoked by the user, but automatically by the code implementing the annotations. For the purpose of this paper, we assume a simple setting for authentication and secrecy, namely that the principals involved possess shared keys. Specifically, we assume a distinct key K pq shared between every pair of principals p and q. We use the key K pq when p acts as the client and q as the web service. (Notice that K pq is different from K qp .) It is straightforward to extend our approach to different settings such as public-key infrastructures or certificate-based authentication mechanisms (see Section 6 ).
An authenticated call by p to a web method ℓ on a web service w owned by q with arguments u 1 , . . . , u n producing a result r uses the following protocol: p → q : request nonce q → p : n q p → q : p, req(w, ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n ), s, n q ), n p , Hash(req(w, ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n ), s, n q ), K pq ) q → p : q, res(w, ℓ(r), s, n p ), Hash(res(w, ℓ(r), s, n p ), K pq )
Here, Hash is a cryptographic hash function (a one-way message digest function such as MD5). We tag the request and the response messages to be able to differentiate them. We also tag the response with the name of the method that was originally called. We include a unique session tag s in both the request and response message to allow the caller p to match the response with the actual call that was performed.
An authenticated and encrypted call by p to a web method ℓ on a web service w owned by q with arguments u 1 , . . . , u n producing a result r uses a similar protocol, with the difference that the third and fourth messages are encrypted using the shared key instead of signed: p → q : request nonce q → p : n q p → q : p, {req(w, ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n ), s, n q )} Kpq , n p q → p : q, {res(w, ℓ(r), s, n p )} Kpq To convince ourselves that the above protocols do enforce the guarantees prescribed by the security abstraction, we typically argue as follows. Let's consider the authenticated and encrypted case, the authenticated case being similar. When the web service w run by principal q receives a request w, ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n ), s, n q encrypted with K pq (q uses the identity p in the request to determine which key to use), it knows that only p could have created the message, assuming that the shared key K pq is kept secret by both p and q. This enforces the integrity of the request. Since the message also contains the nonce n q that the web service can check has never appeared in a previous message, it knows that the message is not a replayed message, hence enforcing at-most-once semantics. Finally, the secrecy of the shared key K pq implies the secrecy of the request. A similar argument shows that the protocol satisfies integrity, at-most-once-semantics, and secrecy for the response.
What do we have at this point? We have an informal description of a security abstraction, we have an implementation of the abstraction in terms of protocols, and an informal argument that the guarantees prescribed by the abstraction are enforced by the implementation. How do we make our security abstraction precise, and how do we ensure that the protocols do indeed enforce the required guarantees? In the next section, we give a formal model to make the abstraction precise. Then, we formalize the implementation by showing how to translate the abstractions into a lower level calculus that uses the above protocols. We use types to show that guarantees are formally met by the implementation, via correspondence assertions.
A Formal Model
We model the application-level view of authenticated messaging as an object calculus. Object calculi [1, 25, 29] are object-oriented languages in miniature, small enough to make formal proofs feasible, yet large enough to study specific features. As in FJ [29] , objects are typed, class-based, immutable, and deterministic. As in some of Abadi and Cardelli's object calculi [1] , we omit subtyping and inheritance for the sake of simplicity. In spite of this simplicity, our calculus is Turing complete. We can define classes to implement arithmetic, lists, collections, and so on.
To model web services, we assume there are finite sets Prin and WebService of principal identifiers and web service identifiers, respectively. We think of each w ∈ WebService as a URL referring to the service; moreover, class(w) is the name of the class that implements the service, and owner (w) ∈ Prin is the principal running the service.
To illustrate this model, we express the banking service interface introduced in the last section in our calculus. Suppose there are two principals Alice, Bob ∈ Prin, and a web service w = http://bob.com/BankingService, where we have owner (w) = Bob and class(w) = BankingServiceClass . Suppose we wish to implement the Balance method so that given an account number, it checks that it has been called by the owner of the account, and if so returns the balance. If Alice's account number is 12345, we might achieve this as follows: There are a few points to note about this code. First, as in BIL [25] , method bodies conform to a single applicative syntax, rather than there being separate grammars for statements and expressions. Second, while the C # code relies on attributes to specify exported methods and security levels, there are not attributes in our calculus. For simplicity, we assume that all the methods of a class implementing a web service are exported as web methods. Furthermore, we assume that all these exported methods are authenticated and encrypted, as if they had been annotated AuthEnc. (It is straightforward to extend our calculus to allow per-method annotations but it complicates the presentation of the translation in the next section.)
Every class implementing a web service has exactly one field, named CallerId , which exposes the identity of the caller, and allows application-level authorisation checks.
We write w:Balance(12345) for a client-side call to method Balance of the service w. The semantics of such a web service call by Alice to a service owned by Bob is that Bob evaluates the local call new BankingServiceClass (Alice).Balance(12345) as Bob. In other words, Bob creates a new object of the formnew BankingServiceClass (Alice) (that is, an instance of the class BankingServiceClass with CallerId set to Alice) and then calls the Balance method. This would terminate with 100, since the value of this.CallerId is Alice. (For simplicity, we assume every class in the object calculus has a single constructor whose arguments are the initial values of the object's fields.) This semantics guarantees to the server Bob that the field CallerId contains the identity of his caller, and guarantees to the client Alice that only the correct owner of the service receives the request and returns the result.
In a typical environment for web services, a client will not invoke web services directly. Rather, a client creates a proxy object corresponding to the web service, which encapsulates the remote invocations. Those proxy objects are generally created automatically by the programming environment. Proxy objects are easily expressible in our calculus, by associating with every web service w a proxy class proxy(w). The class proxy(w) has a method for every method of the web service class, the implementation for which simply calls the corresponding web service method. The proxy class also has a field Id holding the identity of the owner of the web service. Here is the client-side proxy class for our example service:
The remainder of this section details the syntax and informal semantics of our object calculus.
Syntax
In addition to Prin and WebService, we assume finite sets Class, Field , Meth of class, field, and method names, respectively.
Classes, Fields, Methods, Principals, Web Services: c ∈ Class class name f ∈ Field field name ℓ ∈ Meth method name p ∈ Prin principal name w ∈ WebService web service name
There are two kinds of data type: Id is the type of principal identifiers, and c ∈ Class is the type of instances of class c. A method signature specifies the types of its arguments and result.
Types and Method Signatures:
A, B ∈ Type ::= type Id principal identifier c object sig ∈ Sig ::= B(A 1 x 1 , . . . , A n x n ) method signature (x i distinct)
An execution environment defines the services and code available in the distributed system. In addition to owner and class, described above, the maps fields and methods specify the types of each field and the signature and body of each method, respectively. We write X → Y and X fin → Y for the sets of total functions and finite maps, respectively, from X to Y . 
The free variables fv (a) of a method body are defined in the usual way, where the only binder is x being bound in b in the expression let x=a in b. We write a{x←b} for the outcome of a capture-avoiding substitution of b for each free occurence of the variable x in method body a. We view method bodies as being equal up to renaming of bound variables. Specifically, we take let x=a in b to be equal to let
Our syntax for bodies is in a reduced form that simplifies its semantics; in examples, it is convenient to allow a more liberal syntax. For instance, let the term if a 1 = a 2 then b 1 else b 2 be short for let x 1 =a 1 in let x 2 =a 2 in if x 1 = x 2 then b 1 else b 2 . We already used this when writing if this.CallerId = Alice then 100 else null in our example. Similarly, we assume a class Num for numbers, and write integer literals such as 100 as shorthand for objects of that class.
Although objects are values, in this calculus, web services are not. This reflects the fact that current WSDL does not allow for web services to be passed as requests or results. We explore an extension of our model to account for web services as "first-class values" in Appendix E.
We assume all method bodies in our execution environment are well-typed. If methods(c)(ℓ) = (sig, b) and the signature sig = B(A 1 x 1 , . . . , A n x n ) we assume that the body b has type B given a typing environment this:c, x 1 :A 1 , . . . , x n :A n . The variable this refers to the object on which the ℓ method was invoked. The type system is given by a typing judgment E ⊢ a : A, saying that a has type A in an environment E of the form x 1 :A 1 , . . . , x n :A n that gives a type to the free variables in a. The domain dom(E) of E is the set of variables {x 1 , . . . , x n } given a type in E. The typing rules, which are standard, are given in Appendix B. We also assume the class class(w) corresponding to each web service w has a single field callerid .
Informal Semantics of our Model
We explain informally the outcome of evaluating a method body b as principal p, that is, on a client or server machine controlled by p. (Only the semantics of web service calls depend on p.) A formal account of this semantics, as well as the typing rules of the calculus, can be found in Appendix B.
To evaluate a value v as p, we terminate at once with v itself.
To evaluate a let-expression let x=a in b as p, we first evaluate a as p. If a terminates with a value v, we proceed to evaluate b{x←v}, that is, b with each occurrence of the variable x replaced with v. The outcome of evaluating b{x←v} as p is the outcome of evaluating the whole expression.
To evaluate a conditional if u = v then a else b as p, we evaluate a as p if u and v are the same; else we evaluate b as p.
To evaluate a field lookup v.f as p, when v is an object value new c(v 1 , . . . , v n ), we check f is the jth field of class c for some j ∈ 1..n (that is, that fields(c) = f i → A i i∈1..n and that f = f j ), and then return v j . If v is null or if the check fails, evaluation has gone wrong.
To evaluate a method call v.ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n ) as p, when v is an object new c(v 1 , . . . , v n ), we check ℓ is a method of class c (that is, that methods(c) = ℓ i → (sig i , b i ) i∈1..m and that ℓ = ℓ j for some j ∈ 1..m) and we check the arity of its signature is n (that is, that sig j = B(A 1 x 1 , . . . , A n x n )) and then we evaluate the method body as p, but with the object v itself in place of the variable this, and actual parameters u 1 , . . . , u n in place of the formal parameters x 1 , . . . , x n (that is, we evaluate the expression b i {this←v, x 1 ←u 1 , . . . , x n ←u n }). If v is null or if either check fails, evaluation has gone wrong.
To evaluate a service call w:ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n ) as p, we evaluate the local method call new c(p).ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n ) as q, where c = class(w) is the class implementing the service, and q = owner (w) is the principal owning the service. (By assumption, c's only field is CallerId of type Id .) This corresponds directly to creating a new object on q's web server to process the incoming request.
A Spi-Calculus Semantics
We confer a formal semantics on our calculus by translation to the spi-calculus [5, 22] , a lower-level language with primitives for message-passing (to model SOAP requests and responses) and cryptography (to model encryption and decryption of SOAP headers and bodies).
A Typed Spi-Calculus (Informal Review)
To introduce the spi-calculus, we formalize the situation where Alice sends a message to Bob using a shared key, together with a correspondence assertion concerning authenticity of the message, as outlined in Section 1. A name is an identifier that is atomic as far as our analysis is concerned. In this example, the names Alice and Bob identify the two principals, the name K represents a symmetric key known only to Alice and Bob, and the name n represents a public communication channel. A message, M or N , is a data structure such as a name, a tuple (M 1 , . . . , M n ), a tagged message t(M ), or a ciphertext {M } N (that is, a message M encrypted with a key N , which is typically a name). A process, P or Q, is a program that may perform local computations such as encryptions and decryptions, and may communicate with other processes by message-passing on named channels. For example, the process P Alice = begin sending(Alice, Bob, M ); out n {M } K defines Alice's behaviour. First, she performs a begin-event labelled by the tagged tuple sending(Alice, Bob, M ), and then she sends the ciphertext {M } K on the channel n. The process P Bob = inp n (x); decrypt x is {y} K ;end sending(Alice, Bob, y); defines Bob's behaviour. He blocks till a message x arrives on the channel n. Then he attempts to decrypt the message with the key K. We assume there is sufficient redundancy, such as a checksum, in the ciphertext that we can tell whether it was encrypted with K. If so, the plaintext message is bound to y, and he performs an end-event labelled sending(Alice, Bob, y). The process new (K); (P Alice | P Bob ) defines the complete system. The composition P Alice | P Bob represents Alice and Bob running in parallel, and able to communicate on shared channels such as n. The binder new(K) restricts the scope of the key K to the process P Alice | P Bob so that no external process may use it. Appendix C contains the grammar of spi messages and processes. The grammar includes the type annotations that are required to appear in spi terms.
We include begin-and end-events in processes simply to specify correspondence assertions. We say a process is safe to mean that in every run, and for every L, there is a distinct, preceding begin L event for every end L event. Our example is safe, because Bob's end-event can only happen after Alice's begin-event.
For correspondence assertions to be interesting, we need to model the possibility of malicious attacks. Let an opponent be a spi-calculus process O, arbitrary except that O itself cannot perform begin-or endevents. We say a process P is robustly safe if and only if P | O is safe for every opponent O. Our example system new (K); (P Alice | P Bob ) is not robustly safe. The opponent cannot acquire the key K since its scope is restricted, but it can intercept messages on the public channel n and mount a replay attack. The opponent inp n (x); out n x; out n x duplicates the encrypted message so that Bob may mistakenly accept M and perform the end-event sending(Alice, Bob, M ) twice. To protect against replays, and to achieve robust safety, we can add a nonce handshake to the protocol.
In summary, spi lets us precisely represent the behaviour of protocol participants, and specify authenticity guarantees by process annotations. Robust safety is the property that no opponent at the level of the spicalculus may violate these guarantees. We omit the details here, but a particular type and effect system verifies robust safety: if a process can be assigned the empty effect, then it is robustly safe. The example above is simple, but the general method works for a wide range of protocol examples [22, 21] .
For the sake of clarity, we defer some of the technical details to the appendices. Specifically, Appendix C contains more details on the spi-calculus and the type and effect sytem, as well as a formal definition of robust safety; Appendix D gives a proof of our technical results.
A Semantics for Local Computation
We translate the types, values, and method bodies of our object calculus to types, messages, and processes, respectively, of the spi calculus. To begin with, we omit web services. Many computational models can be studied by translation to process calculi; our translation of local computation follows a fairly standard pattern.
We use the notation [[ ] ] to represent the translation of the types and terms of our object calculus to appropriate types, messages, and processes in the spi calculus. In many places, we also define abbreviations in the spi calculus (for instance, we define let x=call w (p, args); P as shorthand for a more complex spi calculus process); these do not use the [[ ]] notation.
We assume that Prin are spi-calculus names, and that Field ∪Meth ∪Class ∪{null} are message tags. The translations for types is straightforward. Since principal identifiers are presumably known to the opponent, the type of identifiers corresponds to the spi type Un. A value of class c is either the value null, or a tagged tuple new c(v 1 , . . . , v n ). As we shall see below, we translate null to a tagged empty tuple null (), and an object to a tagged tuple c(v 1 , . . . , v n ). Thus, a class c translates to a tagged union type with components null(Un) and c(Un). (The types Un indicate that the content of the tuples are presumably known to the opponent.)
Type Translation:
Environment Translation:
If As = A 1 , . . . , A n and xs = x 1 , . . . , x n we sometimes write B(As xs) as shorthand for the signature B (A 1 x 1 , . . . , A n x n ). We define two shorthands for types corresponding to web method calls. The type Req(w) represents the type of possible calls to web methods provided by the service w; the type of a call is simply the translated type of the arguments of the web method, tagged with the name of the method. Similarly, the type Res(w) represents the type of the results of web methods provided by the service w; the type of a result of a call is simply the translated type of the result of the web method, tagged once again with the name of the method.
Request and Response Types:
i∈1..n ) where class(w) = c and methods
The translation of expressions really acts on the type derivation of an expression, not just the expression itself. This means that during the translation of an expression, we have access to the types of the subexpressions appearing in the expression. To reduce clutter, we write the translation as though it is acting on the expression itself, except that when we need access to the type of a subexpression, we annotate the appropriate subexpression with its type. For example, the translation of let x=a in b depends on the type of a, which is available through the type derivation of E ⊢ let x=a in b : B. We write let x=a A in b to indicate that the type of a is A, according to the type derivation. Values translate easily; in particular, an object translates to a tagged tuple containing the values of its fields.
Translation of a Value v to a Message
We translate a body b to a process [[b] ] p k that represents the evaluation of b as principal p. The name k is a continuation, a communications channel on which we send [[v] ] to represent termination with value v. Since our focus is representing safety rather than liveness properties, we represent an evaluation that goes wrong simply by the inactive process stop; it would be easy-but a complication-to add an exception mechanism. We use standard split and case statements to analyse tuples and tagged messages, respectively. To call a method ℓ of an object v of class c, with arguments u 1 , . . . , u n we send the tuple (p, [[v 
The name p is the caller, and channel k is the continuation for the call. We translate method ℓ of class c to a process that repeatedly awaits such messages, and triggers evaluations of its body. We defer the translation of web method calls until Section 4.3. Our translation depends in part on type information; we write v c in the translation of field lookups and method calls to indicate that c is the type of v.
Translation of a Method Body b to a Process
Translation of Method ℓ of Class c:
A Semantics for Web Services
We complete the semantics for our object calculus by translating our cryptographic protocol for calling a web service to the spi-calculus. A new idea is that we embed begin-and end-events in the translation to represent the abstract authenticity guarantees offered by the object calculus.
We assume access to all web methods is at the highest security level AuthEnc from Section 2, providing both authentication and secrecy. Here is the protocol, for p making a web service call w:ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n ) to service w owned by q, including the names of continuation channels used at the spi level. Recall that the protocol assumes that the client has a way to query the web service for a nonce. Therefore, we assume that in addition to the methods of class(w), each web service also supports a method getnonce, which we implement specially.
We are assuming there is a shared key K pq for each pair of principals p, q ∈ Prin. For the sake of brevity, we omit the formal description of the type and effect system [21] we rely on, but see Appendix C for a detailed overview. Still, to give a flavour, we can define the type of a shared key K pq as follows:
Type of Key Shared Between Client p and Server q:
SharedKey ( 
)])))
The type says we can use the key in two modes. First, we may encrypt a plaintext tagged req containing four components: a public name w of a service, an argument a suitable for the service, a session tag t, and a nonce n q proving that a begin-event labelled req(p, q, w, a, t) has occurred, and therefore that an end-event with that label would be safe. Second, we may encrypt a plaintext tagged res containing four components: a service w, a result r from that service, the session tag t, and a nonce n p proving that a begin-event labelled res(p, q, w, r, t) has occurred. We translate a service call to the client-side of our cryptographic protocol as follows. We start by embedding a begin-event labelled req(p, q, w, ℓ(
, t) to record the details of client p's call to server q = owner (w). We request a nonce n q , and use it to freshen the encrypted request, which we send with our own nonce n p , which the server uses to freshen its response. If the response indeed contains our nonce, we embed an end-event to record successful authentication. For the sake of brevity, we rely on some standard shorthands for pattern-matching.
Translation of Web Method Call:
end res(p, q, w, r, t); case r is ℓ(x); out k x where q = owner (w) Our server semantics relies on a shorthand notation defined below; let x=call w (p, ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n )); P runs the method ℓ of the class class(w) implementing the service w, with arguments u 1 , . . . , u n , and with its CallerId field set to p, binds the result to x and runs P .
Server-Side Invocation of a Web Method:
Finally, we implement each service w by a process I ws (w). We repeatedly listen for nonce requests, reply with one, and then await a web service call freshened by the nonce. If we find the nonce, it is safe to perform an end-event labelled req(p, q, w, a, t), where p is the caller, q = owner (w) is the service owner, a is the received method request, and t is the session tag. We use the shorthand above to invoke a. If r is the result, we perform a begin-event labelled res(p, q, w, r, t) to record we are returning a result, and then send a response, freshened with the nonce we received from the client. In general, the notation i∈1..n P i means
Web Service Implementation:
This semantics is subject to more deadlocks than a realistic implementation, since we do not have a single database of outstanding nonces. Still, since we are concerned only with safety properties, not liveness, it is not a problem that our semantics is rather more nondeterministic than an actual implementation.
Security Properties of a Complete System
We define the process Sys(b, p, k) to model a piece of code b being run by principal p (with continuation k) in the context of implementations of all the classes and web services in Class and WebService. The implementation of the classes and web services are given as follows.
Implementation of Classes and Web Services:
ClMeth {(c, ℓ) : c ∈ Class, ℓ ∈ dom(methods(c))} I class (c,ℓ)∈ClMeth I class (c, ℓ) I ws w∈WebService I ws (w)
The process Sys(b, p, k) is defined with respect to an environment that specifies the type of its free variables, such as the names of the web services, principals, classes and methods, and keys.
Top-Level Environments:
The process Sys(b, p, k) is defined as follows:
We claim that the ways an opponent O can interfere with the behaviour of Sys(b, p, k) correspond to the ways in which an actual opponent lurking on a network could interfere with SOAP-level messages being routed between web servers. The names c ℓ of methods are hidden, so O cannot interfere with calls to local methods. The keys K pq are also hidden, so O cannot decrypt or fake SOAP-level encryption. On the other hand, the names w on which Sys(b, p, k) sends and receives our model of SOAP envelopes are public, and so O is free to intercept, replay, or modify such envelopes.
Our main result is that an opponent cannot disrupt the authenticity properties embedded in our translation. The proof is by showing the translation preserves types.
Proof. See Appendix D.1.
A SOAP-Level Implementation
We have implemented the security abstraction introduced in Section 2 and formalized in Sections 3 and 4 on top of the Microsoft Visual Studio .NET implementation of web services, as a library that web service developers and clients can use. A web service developer adds security attributes to the web methods of the service. The developer also needs to provide a web method to supply a nonce to the client. On the client side, the client writer is provided with a modified proxy class that encapsulates the implementation of the security abstraction and takes into account the security level of the corresponding web service methods. Hence, from a client's point of view, there is no fundamental difference between accessing a web service with security annotations and one without.
Consider an implementation of our running example of a banking service. Here is what (an extract of) the class implementing the web service looks like: 
. } }
This is the code we currently have, and it is close to the idealized interface we gave in Section 2. The differences are due to implementation restrictions imposed by the development environment. The extract shows that the web service implements the RequestNonce method required by the authentication protocol. The Balance method is annotated as an authenticated method, and is also annotated to indicate that the headers of the SOAP messages used during a call will be available through the header field of the interface. (The class DSHeader has fields corresponding to the headers of the SOAP message.) As we shall see shortly, SOAP headers are used to carry the authentication information. Specifically, the authenticated identity of the caller is available in a web method through header.callerid.
To implement the security abstraction on the web service side, we use a feature of Visual Studio .NET called SOAP Extensions. Roughly speaking, a SOAP Extension acts like a programmable "filter". It can be installed on either (or both) of a client or a web service. It gets invoked on every incoming and outgoing SOAP message, and can be used to examine and modify the content of the message before forwarding it to its destination. In our case, the extension will behave differently according to whether the message is incoming or outgoing, and depending on the security level specified. For an outgoing message, if the security level is None, the SOAP message is unchanged. If the security level is Auth, messages are signed as specified by the protocol: a cryptographic hash of the SOAP body and the appropriate nonce is stored in a custom header of the messages. If the security level is AuthEnc, messages are encrypted as specified by the protocol, before being forwarded. For incoming messages, the messages are checked and decrypted, if required. If the security level is Auth, the signature of the message checked. If the security level is AuthEnc, the message is decrypted before being forwarded. Our implementation uses the SHA1 hash function for signatures, and the RC2 algorithm for symmetric encryption.
To implement the security abstraction on the client side, we provide the client with a new proxy class. The new proxy class provides methods None, Auth, and AuthEnc, that are called by the proxy methods to initiate the appropriate protocol. The method None simply sets up the headers of the SOAP message to include the identity of the caller and the callee. Auth and AuthEnc do the same, but also make a call to the web service to get a nonce and add it (along with a newly created nonce) to the headers. The actual signature and encryption of the SOAP message is again performed using SOAP Extensions, just as on the web service side.
Our implementation uses a custom SOAP header DSHeader to carry information such as nonces, identities, and signatures. It provides the following elements:
callerid identity of the client calleeid identity of the web service provider np client nonce nq web service nonce signature cryptographic signature of the message Not all of those elements are meaningful for all messages. In addition to these headers, in the cases where the message is encrypted, the SOAP body is replaced by the encrypted body. Appendix A gives actual SOAP messages exchanged between the client and web service during an authenticated call to Balance, and an authenticated and encrypted call to Statement.
A Semantics Using Asymmetric Cryptography
The security abstraction we describe in Section 2 relies on shared keys between principals. This is hardly a reasonable setup in modern systems. In this section, we show that our approach can easily accommodate public-key infrastructures.
Authenticated Web Methods
We start by describing the protocol and implementation for authenticated web methods. Hence, for now, we assume that all the exported methods of a web service are annotated with Auth.
Consider a simple public-key infrastructure for digital signatures. Each principal p has a signing key SKp and a verification key VKp. The signing key is kept private, while the verification key is public. To bind the name of a principal with their verification key, we assume a certification authority CA (itself with a signing key SKCA and verification key VKCA) that can sign certificates CertVKp of the form {|p, VKp|} SKCA . (The notation {| · |} K is used to represent both asymmetric encryption and signature, differentiating it from symmetric encryption. In the case where {|M |} K represent a signature, this is simply notation for M along with a token representing the signature of M with asymmetric key K.)
Here is a protocol that uses digital signatures to authenticate messages, for p making a web service call w:ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n ) to service w owned by q, including the names of continuation channels used at the spi level. Again, we assume that in addition to the methods of class(w), each web service also supports a method getnonce, which we implement specially. We will represent the key pair of a signing key and verification key for principal p by a pair DSp, of type AuthKeys(p). The key pair for the certification authority will be represented by a pair DSCA. We use the following abbreviations:
Key and Certificates Abbreviations:
With that in mind, we can amend the translation of Section 4 to accommodate the new protocol. First, we give a new translation for a web method call w:ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n ):
New Translation of Web Method Call:
end res(p, q, w, r, t); case r is ℓ(x); out k x where q = owner (w)
We also need to give a new implementation for web services, again to take into account the different messages being exchanged:
New Web Service Implementation: 
Finally, we need to change the top-level environment to account for the new keys, and to add a channel through which we will publish the public keys.
Top-Level
Publishing can be achieved by simply sending the public keys on a public channel, here net:
Public Keys Publishing:
We can now establish that the resulting system is robustly safe: The protocol we give above to provide authentication has some undesirable properties. Specifically, it requires the server to remember the certificate CertVKp and nonce n p at the time when a nonce is requested. Since anyone can request a nonce, and no authentication is performed at that stage of the protocol, this makes the server severely vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks. The following variation on the protocol achieves the same guarantees, but pushes the exchange of certificates and nonces to later messages, basically just when they are needed. (u 1 , . . . , u n ), t, q, n q )|} SKp , k 2 q → p on k 2 : q, CertVKq, {|res(w, ℓ(r), t, p, n p )|} SKq
Authenticated and Encrypted Web Methods
We now describe a protocol and implementation for authenticated and encrypted web methods. Hence, for now, we assume that all the exported methods of a web service are annotated with AuthEnc.
The public-key infrastructure we consider for this case is similar to the one for authenticated web methods, except that now we have encryption and decryption keys, as opposed to signing and verification keys. Each principal p has an encryption key EKp and a decryption key DKp. The decryption key is kept private, while the encryption key is public. To bind the name of a principal with their encryption key, we again assume a certification authority CA (with a signing key SKCA and verification key VKCA) that can sign certificates CertEKp of the form {|p, EKp|} SKCA .
Here is a protocol for p making a web service call w:ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n ) to service w owned by q, including the names of continuation channels used at the spi level. Again, we assume that in addition to the methods of class(w), each web service also supports a method getnonce, which we implement specially.
This protocol is similar to that for authenticated web methods, except that public key encryption is used to exchange a session-specific shared key K used to encrypt the actual method call. Specifically, in the third message, p chooses a session-specific shared key K, and sends it to q encrypted with q's public key EKq; this session key K is used to encrypt the web method call. The result of the web method call is also encrypted with this shared key. To prevent replay attacks, the shared key is bound to a nonce n K sent by q in the second message. We will represent the key pair of an encryption key and decryption key for principal p by a pair PKp, of type AuthEncKeys(p). The signing key pair for the certification authority will be represented by a pair DSCA. We use the following abbreviations: 
Key and Certificates
end req(p, q, w, a, t); let r:Res(w)=call w (p, a); begin res(p, q, w, r, t); cast n p is (n Finally, we need to change the top-level environment to account for the new keys, and to add a channel through which we will publish the public keys. 
We can now establish that the resulting system is robustly safe:
A and p ∈ Prin and k / ∈ dom(E 0 ) then the system
Proof. See Appendix D.3.
We can note some further possibilities, with respect to the protocols implemented in this section:
• The protocol implementing authenticated and encrypted invocation uses certificates to essentially negotiate a symmetric key with which to actually perform the encryption. It is straightforward to apply the same idea to the authenticated-only case, negotiating a symmetric key with which to hash the content of the method call (instead of relying on public-key signatures). • In the above protocol, a new symmetric key is negotiated at every method invocation. A more efficient variation would be to re-use a negotiated symmetric key over multiple web method calls. Once a symmetric key has been negotiated, it can effectively act as a shared key between the two principals, which is the case we investigated in the body of this paper. We can therefore use the above protocol for the first web method call between a principal and a particular service, and the shared-key protocol for subsequent web method calls.
Related Work
There has been work for almost twenty years on secure RPC mechanisms, going back to Birrell [10] . More recently, secure RPC has been studied in the context of distributed object systems. As we mentioned, our work was inspired by the work of van Doorn et al. [35] , itself inspired by [30, 36] . These techniques (or similar ones) have been applied to CORBA [31] , DCOM [11] , and Java [7, 19] . In contrast, little work seems to have been done on formalizing secure RPC. Of note is the work of Abadi, Fournet, and Gonthier [2, 3] , who show how to compile the standard join-calculus into the sjoin-calculus, and show that the compilation is fully abstract. In a subsequent paper [4] , they treat similarly and more simply a join-calculus with authentication primitives: each message contains its source address, there is a way to extract the principal owning a channel from the channel, and any piece of code runs as a particular principal. Their fully abstract translation gives very strong guarantees: it shows that for all intents and purposes, we can reason at the highest level (at the level of the authentication calculus). Although our guarantees are weaker, they are easier to establish.
Duggan [18] formalizes an application-level security abstraction by introducing types for signed and encrypted messages; he presents a fully abstract semantics for the abstraction by translation to a spi-calculus.
Much of the literature on security in distributed systems studies the question of access control. Intuitively, access control is the process of determining if the principal calling a particular method has permission to access the objects that the method refers to, according to a particular access control policy. There is a distinction to be made between authentication and access control. Authentication determines whether the principal calling a method is indeed the principal claiming to be calling the method, while access control can use this authenticated identity to determine whether that principal is allowed access. This distinction is made clear in the work of Balfanz et al. [7] , where they provide authenticated and encrypted communication over Java RMI (using SSL) and use that infrastructure as a basis for a logic-based access control mechanism. The access control decisions are based on the authenticated caller identity obtained from the layer in charge of authentication. This approach is also possible in our framework, which provides access to an authenticated identity as well. We plan to study access control abstractions in our framework. Various forms of access control mechanisms have been formalized via π-calculi, [26, 33, 27] , and other process calculi [13, 16] . An access control language based on temporal logic has been defined by Sirer and Wang [34] specifically for web services. Damiani et al. [15] describe an implementation of an access control model for SOAP; unlike our work, and the WS-Security proposal, it relies on an underlying secure channel, such as an SSL connection.
Since this work was completed, a series of specifications for web services security has been published, as laid out in a whitepaper from IBM and Microsoft [28] . In particular, WS-Security [6] defines how to add signatures, to apply encryption, and to add principal identities, such as usernames or certificates, to a SOAP envelope. It would be straightforward, for example, to adapt our implementation to produce WS-Security compliant SOAP envelopes. A recent paper shows how to formalize the authentication goals of protocols based on WS-Security using the applied π-calculus [9] .
Despite its enjoyable properties, the formal model we use to study the implementation of our security abstraction suffers from some limitations. For instance, it makes the usual Dolev-Yao assumptions that the adversary can compose messages, replay them, or decipher them if it knows the right key, but cannot otherwise "crack" encrypted messages. A more severe restriction is that we cannot yet model insider attacks: principals with shared keys are assumed well-behaved. Work is in progress to extend the Cryptyc type theory to account for malicious insiders. We have not verified the hash-based protocol of Section 2.
Conclusions
Authenticated method calls offer a convenient abstraction for developers of both client and server code. Various authorisation mechanisms may be layered on top of this abstraction. This paper proposes such an abstraction for web services, presents a theoretical model, and describes an implementation using SOAP-level security. By typing our formal semantics, we show no vulnerability exists to attacks representable within the spi-calculus, given certain assumptions. Vulnerabilities may exist outside our model-there are no methods, formal or otherwise, to guarantee security absolutely.
While our approach is restricted to proving properties of protocols that can be established using the Cryptyc type and effect system, it is worth pointing out that it is compatible with alternative methods for protocol verification. For instance, it is possible to analyze the protocols we use to implement secure web method calls for security flaws beyond those that can be uncovered using Cryptyc (for instance, flaws involving malicious insiders).
Our work shows that by exploiting recent advances in authenticity types, we can develop a theoretical model of a security abstraction, and then almost immediately obtain precise guarantees. (As with many formal analyses, these guarantees concern the design of our abstraction, and do not rule out code defects in its actual implementation.)
This study furthermore validates the adequacy of the spi-calculus, and Cryptyc in particular, to formally reason about security properties in a distributed communication setting.
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A. Sample SOAP Messages
We give some sample SOAP messages exchanged during web service method calls of the web service described in Section 5. One thing that is immediately clear is that we are not using standard XML formats for signing and encrypting messages, such as XML-Encryption and XML-Signature. There is no intrinsic difficulty in adapting our infrastructure to use standard formats. The point is that the validation of the security abstraction does not rely on the exact syntax of the SOAP envelopes.
A.1. An Authenticated Call
We describe an authenticated call to the Balance method. The messages exchanged to obtained the nonce are standard SOAP messages. The following message is the request from Alice to the web service to execute the Balance method on argument 12345. Notice the DSHeader element holding the identity of the principals involved, as well as the nonces and the cryptographic signature.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf- 
A.2. Authenticated and Encrypted Call
We describe an authenticated and encrypted call, this time to the Statement method. Again, the messages exchanged to obtained the nonce are standard SOAP messages. The following message is the request from Alice to the web service to execute the Statement method on argument 12345. As in the authenticated call above, the DSHeader element holds identity information. The body of the message itself is encrypted. Note that the nonce nq must be encrypted according to the protocol, so its encrypted value is included in the encrypted data, and its element is reset to a dummy value (here, -1). Similarly, the signature is unused and set to a dummy value.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf- The response is similarly encoded. Notice that this time the nonce np must be encrypted, so its value is again included in the encrypted data, and its element is reset to a dummy value.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3. 
B. Semantics of the Object Calculus
In this appendix, we give a formal description of the operational semantics and typing rules of the object calculus. We first describe some encodings showing the expressiveness of the calculus.
B.1. Encoding Arithmetic
The calculus is simple enough that questions about whether or not it is sufficiently expressive to be of interest arise. This is especially likely since there are no recursive functions in the calculus, and it is not clear that it is even Turing complete. That the calculus indeed is Turing complete is a consequence of the fact that we can write recursive classes and methods, and that we have a null object. The following example shows an encoding of natural numbers as a class Num, with the typical recursive definition of addition: 
B.2. Formalization of proxy objects
We mentioned in the text that we can easily express proxy objects within the calculus. For completeness, here is a detailed formalization of such proxy objects. First, we assume a map proxy ∈ WebService → Class, assigning to every web service w ∈ WebService a proxy class proxy(w). We further assume that for each w ∈ WebService, (A 1 x 1 , . . . , A n x n ), w:ℓ(x 1 , . . . , x n )), where methods(class(w))(ℓ) = (B (A 1 x 1 , . . . , A n x n ), b).
• dom(methods(class(w))) ∪ {Id } = dom(methods(proxy(w))), • fields(proxy(w)) = ∅, • methods(proxy(w)(Id )) = (Id (), owner (w)), and • for all ℓ ∈ dom(methods(class(w))), methods(proxy(w))(ℓ) = (B

B.3. Operational Semantics
The operational semantics is defined by a transition relation, written a → p a ′ , where a and a ′ are method bodies, and p is the principal evaluating the body a.
To specify the semantics, we need to keep track of which principal is currently running a method body.
We add a new method body form to our object calculus, p[a], meaning p running body a. This form does not appear in code written by the user, but only arises through the transitions of the semantics.
Extended Method Bodies: a, b ∈ Body ::= method body
body a running as p
Transitions:
B.4. Type System
The judgments of our type system all depend on an environment E, that defines the types of all variables in scope. An environment takes the form x 1 :A 1 , . . . , x n :A n and defines the type A i for each variable x i . The domain dom(E) of an environment E is the set of variables whose types it defines.
Environments:
The following are the two judgments of our type system. They are inductively defined by rules presented in the following tables.
We write E ⊢ J when we want to talk about both kinds of judgments, where J stands for either ⋄ or a : A.
The following rules define an environment x 1 :A 1 , . . . , x n :A n to be well-formed if each of the names x 1 , . . . , x n are distinct.
Rules for Environments:
We present the rules for deriving the judgment E ⊢ a : A that assigns a type A to a value or method body a. These rules are split into two tables, one for values, and one for method bodies.
Rules for Typing Values:
Rules for Typing Method Bodies:
We make the following assumption on the execution environment.
Assumptions on the Execution Environment:
(1) For each w ∈ WebService, fields(class(w)) = CallerId : Id . It is straightforward to show that our type system is sound, that is, that the type system ensures that methods that typecheck do not get stuck when evaluating. Some care is needed to make this precise, since evaluation can block if one attempts to access a field of a null object, or to invoke a method on a null object. (We could introduce an error token in the semantics and propagate that error token when such a case is encountered, but this would needlessly complicate the semantics, at least for our purposes.) Soundness can be derived as usual via Preservation and Progress theorems. To establish these, we first need the following lemmas: Lemma 1. The following properties of judgments hold:
(Exchange) if E, x:A, y:B, E ′ ⊢ J , then E, y:B, x:A, E ′ ⊢ J ; (Weakening) if E ⊢ J and x ∈ dom(E), then E, x:A ⊢ J ; (Strengthening) if E, x:B ⊢ a : A and x ∈ fv (a), then E ⊢ a : A.
Proof. Straightforward.
We often use the above properties silently in the course of proofs.
Lemma 2 (Substitution)
. If E, x:B ⊢ a : A and E ⊢ v : B, then E ⊢ a{x←v} : A Proof This is a straightforward proof by induction on the height of the typing derivation for E ⊢ a : A.
We proceed by case analysis on the form of a. We have E, x:
.n . By the induction hypothesis, we know E ⊢ v i {x←v} : A i for all i ∈ 1..n. Hence, we can derive E ⊢ new c(v 1 {x←v}, . . . , v n {x←v}) : A, as required.
-Case a = let y=a 0 in b: Without loss of generality, we can take y = x, since y is bound in b. Note that (let y=a 0 in b){x←v} = let y=a 0 {x←v} in b{x←v}. We have E, x:B ⊢ let y=a 0 in b : A, hence E, x:B ⊢ a 0 : A 0 for some A 0 , and E, y:A 0 , x:B ⊢ b : A. By the induction hypothesis, E ⊢ a 0 {x←v} : A 0 and E, y:A 0 ⊢ b{x←v} : A, and hence E ⊢ let x=a 0 {x←v} in b{x←v} : A, as required.
A and E, x:B ⊢ a 1 : A. Applying the induction hypothesis to these judgments, we can derive
The remaining cases are similar, upon noting that: (u 1 , . . . , u m )){x←v} = u{x←v}(u 1 {x←v}, . . . , u m {x←v}), -(w:ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n )){x←v} = w:(u 1 {x←v}, . . . , u n {x←v}), and
Proof
We proceed by induction on the height of the typing derivation for E ⊢ a : A. Since a → p a ′ , a cannot be a value v.
-Case a = let x=v in b: Since E ⊢ a : A, we have E ⊢ v : B and E, x:B ⊢ b : A. We must have a ′ = b{x←v}. Applying the Substitution Lemma, we have E ⊢ b{x←v} : A, as required. = (new c(v 1 , . . . , v n ) ).f j : We have fields(c) = f i → A i i∈1..n . The type derivation for a is as follows:
.n , where sig j = B (A 1 x 1 , . . . , A m x m ). By the typing derivation for E ⊢ a : B, we have E ⊢ u k : A k for all k ∈ 1..m, and E ⊢ v : c. By assumption on the execution environment, we know this:c,
Applying the Substitution and the Weakening Lemmas, we get E ⊢ b{this←v, x k ←u k k∈1..m } : B, as required.
.n where sig j = B (A 1 x 1 , . . . , A m x m ). By the typing derivation for E ⊢ a : B, we have E ⊢ u i : A i for all i ∈ 1..m. We can therefore derive the required type for a To state the Progress Theorem, we need to recognize programs that are blocked because of a null in object position. We say a method body a is null-blocked if, essentially, it is stuck trying to access a field of a null object, or invoke a method on a null object. Formally, a is null-blocked if it is of the form null .f j , null.ℓ(u 1 , . . . , u n ), let x=a in b (where a is null-blocked), or q[a] (where a is null-blocked).
Theorem 5 (Progress). If ∅ ⊢ a : A and a is not a value and is not null-blocked, and p ∈ Prin, then a → p a ′ for some a ′ .
Proof Again, we proceed by induction on the height of the typing derivation for ∅ ⊢ a : A. We assume a is not a value, and a is not null-blocked.
-Case a = let x=a 0 in b: We consider two subcases, depending on whether a 0 is a value or not.
-Case a 0 is a value v: We have a → p b{x←v}. -Case a 0 is not a value: Since ∅ ⊢ a : A, we have ∅ ⊢ a 0 : B for some B, a 0 not a value. Since a is not null-blocked, a 0 is not null-blocked. Hence, by induction hypothesis, we have
We have a → p a 0 or a → p a 1 depending on the result of u = v. -Case a = v.f j : Since ∅ ⊢ a : A and a is not null-blocked, we must have v = new c(u 1 , . . . , u n ), and 
We can now state soundness formally. We say a method body a is stuck if a is not a value, a is not null-blocked, and there is no a ′ and p such that a → p a ′ . We write a → * a ′ to mean that there exists a sequence a 1 , . . . , a n and principals p 1 , . . . , p n+1 such that a → p1 a 1 → p2 · · · → pn a n → pn+1 a ′ . (Hence, → * is a kind of transitive closure of → p .)
Theorem 6 (Soundness). If ∅ ⊢ a : A, and a → * a ′ , then a ′ is not stuck.
Proof.
A straightforward induction on the number of transitions in a → * a ′ .
C. The Spi-Calculus in More Detail
We give an overview of the language and type system on which our analysis of web services depends. We give the syntax in detail, but for the sake of brevity give only an informal account of the operational semantics and type system. Full details are in a technical report [21] , from which some of the following explanations are drawn. Some constructs primitive here are actually derived forms in the original calculus.
Names, Messages:
The message x is a name, representing a channel, nonce, symmetric key, or asymmetric key-pair. We do not differentiate in the syntax or operational semantics between key-pairs used for public key cryptography and those used for digital signatures.
The message (M 1 , . . . , M n ) is a record with n fields, M 1 , . . . , M n . The message t i (M ) is message M tagged with tag t i . The message {M } N is the ciphertext obtained by encrypting the plaintext M with the symmetric key N .
The message {|M |} N is the ciphertext obtained by encrypting the plaintext M with the asymmetric encryption key N .
The message Decrypt (M ) is the decryption key (or signing key) component of the key-pair M , and Encrypt (M ) is the encryption key (or verification key) component of the key-pair M .
Types and Effects:
ℓ ::= Public | Private nonce attribute S, T, U ::= type Un data known to the opponent (
shared-key type KeyPair(T ) asymmetric key-pair k Key(T ) encryption or decryption part ℓ Challenge es challenge type ℓ Response fs response type e, f ::= atomic effect end L end-event labelled L check ℓ N name-check for a nonce N trust M :T trust that M :T es, fs ::= effect [e 1 , . . . , e n ] multiset of atomic effects
The type Un describes messages that may flow to or from the opponent, which we model as an arbitrary process of the calculus. We say that a type is public if messages of the type may flow to the opponent. Dually, we say a type is tainted if messages from the opponent may flow into the type. The type Un is both public and tainted.
The type (x 1 :T 1 , . . . , x n :T n ) describes a record (M 1 , . . . , M n ) where each M i : T i . The scope of each variable x i consists of the types T i+1 , . . . , T n . Type (x 1 :T 1 , . . . , x n :T n ) is public just if all of the types T i are public, and tainted just if all of the types T i are tainted.
The type Union(t 1 (T 1 ), . . . , t n (T n )) describes a tagged message t i (M ) where i ∈ 1..n and M : T i . Type Union(t 1 (T 1 ), . . . , t n (T n )) is public just if all of the types T i are public, and tainted just if all of the types T i are tainted.
The type Top describes all well-typed messages; it is tainted but not public. The type SharedKey(T ) describes symmetric keys for encrypting messages of type T ; it is public or tainted just if T is both public and tainted.
The type KeyPair(T ) describes asymmetric key-pairs for encrypting or signing messages of type T ; it is public or tainted just if T is both public and tainted. The key-pair can be used for public-key cryptography just if T is tainted, and for digital signatures just if T is public.
The type Encrypt Key(T ) describes an encryption or signing key for messages of type T ; it is public just if T is tainted, and it is tainted just if T is public.
The type Decrypt Key(T ) describes a decryption or verification key for messages of type T ; it is public just if T is public, and it is tainted just if T it tainted.
The types ℓ Challenge es and ℓ Response fs describe nonce challenges and responses, respectively. The effects es and fs embedded in these types represent certain events. An outgoing challenge of some type ℓ Challenge es can be cast into a response of type ℓ Response fs and then returned, provided the events in the effect es + fs have been justified, as explained below. Therefore, if we have created a fresh challenge at type ℓ Challenge es, and check that it equals an incoming response of type ℓ Response fs, we can conclude that the events in es + fs may safely be performed. The attribute ℓ is either Public or Private; the former means the nonce may eventually be public, while the latter means the nonce is never made public. Type Public Challenge es is public, or tainted, just if es = [ ]. Type Public Response fs is always public, but tainted just if es = [ ]. Neither Private Challenge es nor Private Response fs is public; both are tainted.
An effect es is a multiset, that is, an unordered list of atomic effects, e or f . Effects embedded in challenge or response types signify that certain actions are justified, that is, may safely be performed. An atomic effect end L justifies a single subsequent end-event labelled L, and is justified by a distinct, preceding begin-event labelled L. An atomic effect check ℓ N justifies a single subsequent check that an ℓ response equals an ℓ challenge named N , where ℓ is Public or Private, and is justified by freshly creating the challenge N . An atomic effect trust M :T justifies casting message M to type T , and is justified by showing that M indeed has type T .
Processes:
O, P, Q, R ::= process out M N output inp M (x:T ); P input (x bound in P ) repeat inp M (x:T ); P replicated input (x bound in P ) split M is (x 1 :T 1 , . . . , x n :T n ); P record splitting match M is (N, y:T ); P pair matching (y bound in P ) case M is t i (x i :T i ); P i i∈1..n tagged union case (
begin-assertion end L; P end-assertion cast M is (x:T ); P cast to nonce type witness M :T ; P witness testimony trust M is (x:T ); P trusted cast
The processes out M N and inp M (x:T ); P are output and input, respectively, along an asynchronous, unordered channel M . If an output out x N runs in parallel with an input inp x (y); P , the two can interact to leave the residual process P {y←N }, the outcome of substituting N for each free occurrence of y in P . We write out x (M ); P as a simple shorthand for out x M | P .
The process repeat inp M (x:T ); P is replicated input, which behaves like input, except that each time an input of N is performed, the residual process P {y←N } is spawned off to run concurrently with the original process repeat inp M (x:T ); P .
The process split M is (x 1 :T 1 , . . . , x n :T n ); P splits the record M into its n components. If M is (M 1 , . . . , M n ), the process behaves as P {x 1 ←M 1 } · · · {x n ←M n }. Otherwise, it deadlocks, that is, does nothing.
The process match M is (N, y:U ); P splits the pair (binary record) M into its two components, and checks that the first one is N . If M is (N, L), the process behaves as P {y←L}. Otherwise, it deadlocks.
The process case M is t i (x i :T i ); P i i∈1..n checks the tagged union M . If M is t j (L) for some j ∈ 1..n, the process behaves as P {x i ←L}. Otherwise, it deadlocks.
The process if M = N then P else Q behaves as P if M and N are the same message, and otherwise as Q. (This process is not present in the original calculus [21] but is a trivial and useful addition.)
The process new (x:T ); P generates a new name x, whose scope is P , and then runs P . This abstractly represents nonce or key generation.
The process P | Q runs processes P and Q in parallel. The process stop is deadlocked. The process decrypt M is {x:T } N ;P decrypts M using symmetric key N . If M is {L} N , the process behaves as P {x←L}. Otherwise, it deadlocks. We assume there is enough redundancy in the representation of ciphertexts to detect decryption failures.
The process decrypt M is {|x:T |} N −1 ;P decrypts M using asymmetric key N . If M is {|L|} Encrypt (K) and N is Decrypt (K), then the process behaves as P {x←L}. Otherwise, it deadlocks.
The process check M is N ; P checks the messages M and N are the same name before executing P . If the equality test fails, the process deadlocks.
The process begin L; P autonomously performs a begin-event labelled L, and then behaves as P . The process end L; P autonomously performs an end-event labelled L, and then behaves as P . The process cast M is (x:T ); P binds the message M to the variable x of type T , and then runs P . In well-typed programs, M is a challenge of type ℓ Challenge es, and T is a response type ℓ Challenge fs. This is the only way to populate a response type.
The process witness M :T ; P simply runs P , but is well-typed only if M has the type T . This is the only way to justify a trust M :T effect.
The process trust M is (x:T ); P binds the message M to the variable x of type T , and then runs P . In well-typed programs, this cast is justified by a previous run of a witness M :T ; Q process.
Next, we recall the notions of process safety, opponents, and robust safety introduced in Section 4. The notion of a run of a process can be formalized by an operational semantics.
Safety:
A process P is safe if and only if for every run of the process and for every L, there is a distinct begin L event for every end L event.
Opponents and Robust Safety:
A process P is assertion-free if and only if it contains no begin-or end-assertions.
A process P is untyped if and only if the only type occurring in P is Un. An opponent O is an assertion-free untyped process. A process P is robustly safe if and only if P | O is safe for every opponent O.
Our problem, then, is to show that processes representing protocols are robustly safe. We appeal to a type and effect system to establish robust safety (but not to define it). The system involves the following type judgments.
good message M of type T E ⊢ P : es good process P with effect es
We omit the rules defining these judgments, which can be found in [21] ; our previous informal explanation of types should give some intuitions.
We made two additions to the language as defined in [21] , namely the empty record type () (and corresponding empty record message ()), and the conditional form if M = N then P else Q. The empty record type can be handled by simply extending the typing rules for records to the case where there are no elements. The main consequence of this is that the type () will be isomorphic to the type Un, by the extended subtyping rules. The extension of spi to handle the conditional is similarly straightforward, except that we need to actually add a transition rule to the operational semantics, and a new typing rule to propagate the effects. For completeness, we describe the additions here, with the understanding that they rely on terminology defined and explained in [21] :
Extensions to Spi for the Conditional:
The type and effect system can guarantee the robust safety of a process, according to the following theorem [21] Some general remarks on typing are in order. A consequence of Lemma 3, as well as our general use of types, reveals that we rely on typing exclusively to show security properties, not to establish standard safety results. For instance, we do not use types to ensure that the type of the arguments supplied at method invocation match the type of the parameters to the method. Indeed, the only channel type in our translation has itself type Un.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we first establish some lemmas.
Lemma 4.
( Proof. (1) We prove this by induction on the height of the type derivation for E ⊢ v : A:
-Case v = x: Since E ⊢ x : A, we must have x:A ∈ E. By definition of the translation for environment, 
4) Let w ∈ WebService, with owner (w) = q. First, note that the following derivation is admissible: is robustly safe.
Proof. Rather than giving a full proof, we point out the parts of the proof of Theorem 1 that need to be updated. Essentially, we need to show that the new semantics for web method invocations is effect-free, and similarly for the new implementation of web services. These occur in the proof of Lemma 4, part (2) and (4). As we did in Lemma 4, rather than giving the full type derivation for the translation of a web service call, we outline the derivation of effects: 
E. First-Class Web Services
The model of web services captured by our calculus in Section 3 does not consider web services to be values. This reflects the fact that current WSDL does not allow for web services to be passed as requests or results. On the other hand, a web service has a simple representation as a string, namely the URL used to access the web service, and this string can be passed as a request or a result. Hence, it is possible, in a sense, to pass web services as values given the current web services infrastructure. In this section, we explore an extension of our object calculus that allows web services as first-class values. The main point here is to show that there is no real difficulty in modelling this aspect of the web services infrastructure. Our main result is type safety. We expect it would be straightforward to translate this extended calculus into the spi-calculus, but we do not describe this in detail.
For the sake of keeping this section essentially self-contained, we give the full syntax and semantics of the extended object calculus.
E.1. Syntax
We assume finite sets Prin, WebService, Class, Field , Meth of principal, web service, class, field, and method names, respectively.
There are now three kinds of data type: Id is the type of principal identifiers, c ∈ Class is the type of instances of class c, and WS (c) is the type of web services with implementation class c ∈ Class. A method signature specifies the types of its arguments and result.
Types and Method Signatures:
A, B ∈ Type ::= type Id principal identifier c object WS (c) web service sig ∈ Sig ::= B (A 1 x 1 , . . . , A n x n ) method signature (x i distinct)
As in Section 3, an execution environment defines the services and code available in the distributed system. The owner and implementation class of a web service need not be globally known. We can assume that the representation of a web service w carries representations of its owner and its implementation class, which class and owner simply read off. Since we assume web services are given, and we do not provide for ways to actually create new web services, there is no loss of generality in taking this particular approach.
The syntax of method bodies and values is that of the original object calculus, with the differences that web services are values, and that we do not assume that web service invocations require a fixed web service. (We assume that the classes Bool , Time, and Void are provided in the execution environment. The details of their implementation are irrelevant to our discussion.) Suppose that Alice has an account on cal , and that she wants to make an appointment with a calendarenabled banking service-that is, a banking service that offers a web method for scheduling appointments with a bank advisor via a calendar service. Consider a calendar-enabled version of the banking service of Section 3. Let w = http://bob.com/BankingService, where we have owner (w) = Bob and class(w) = BankingServiceClass . We add a web method MakeAppt to BankingServiceClass that takes as argument a time period during which the appointment is sought, and a calendar service that the banking service can query to confirm that a common free time slot is available between the client and the bank advisor. The interface of the augmented banking service is as follows: 
